고려대학교 국제학부 국제대학원

Prof. Seung Ho Lee's Book Review article have been published!

The contents is as follows: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02508060.2023.2192456

China’s hydro-politics in the Mekong – conflict and cooperation in light of securitization theory 

The Mekong River basin continues to draw water experts’ attention because of the complex relationship between the riparian countries – China (upstream), Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (downstream) – and the many overlapping water resources management issues, especially hydropower development, fisheries, biodiversity and food security.

 Sebastian Biba has investigated the diverse engagements between the Mekong’s riparian countries using securitization theory to appraise China’s multilayered behaviours, summarized as conflict ‘and’ cooperation. As a prelude, Biba describes the soaring regional demands of domestic water consumption for households, agriculture, industries, energy and the environment. He also suggests that China – as the upstream riparian – is very likely to have a differing perspective from its Asian neighbours on its secure access to shared water resources. Biba documents China’s rise as a superpower and discusses its good neighbour policy for soothing its co-riparian countries, which are wary of China’s dominance over their shared water resources.

 Biba elucidates four major reasons why the Mekong River is of great importance to China: (1) the country has built a myriad of hydropower dams upstream (11 dams as of September 2022); (2) the river is shared by the highest number of riparian countries out of all of China’s numerous international rivers, and it is the only river with an established and authoritative international river organization: the Mekong River Commission (MRC); (3) civil society groups have a strong influence, and they have criticized dam development in the basin; and (4) the river basin is also part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, with which good relations are imperative for China’s regional diplomacy.

 In his analysis of the basin’s inter-state relations, Biba introduces securitization theory, an argument that both cooperation and conflict should coexist between riparian countries. This theory reveals dynamic interactions in China’s international hydropolitics. Biba maintains that the theory is useful for integrating contextual factors to illuminate the linkages between regional hydropolitics and China’s broader foreign policy. Biba also argues that China appears to pursue a non-securitization approach with downstream riparian countries, where cooperation (politics) is preferred over conflict (security). However, this ‘cooperation’ is characterized by pre-emptive and silencing strategies that actually close cooperation opportunities in non-political areas that China prefers not to address.

 From the perspective of this non-securitization perspective, Biba analyses the establishment of the MRC through the Mekong Agreement (1995), with all four downstream countries as members. China and Myanmar, also upstream, became ‘dialogue partners’ of the MRC the following year. He argues that China, as a strong upstream power, had no strategic interest in becoming a full member of the MRC because it would have entailed making concessions to the downstream countries under the rules they had set.

 Biba stresses that it is China’s broader socio-economic development agenda, not water resources management, that neatly explains why it has been actively involved in the Greater Mekong Subregion programme. In fact, China’s dam construction in the upper reaches of the Mekong (called the Lancang in China) since the late 1980s has been a source of conflict with downstream countries. However, Biba’s appraisal of the downstream countries’ multilayered responses did not necessarily find only negative messages on the Chinese dams.

 Indeed, the downstream neighbours themselves have been strategic in their messaged responses to China’s upstream water plans. Although there have been variations in commentaries’ tone, the downstream countries’ governments seem to be on China’s side; their commentaries are quiet or even positive about the implications of China’s upstream dams. Vietnam has been the sole exception, which has openly criticized China’s dam-building, but even here its tones and narratives have been mild and unprovoking. In stark contrast, numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have aggressively criticized China’s unilateral dam development and its possible impacts on downstream communities, especially local livelihoods, fish migration and ecosystems. Biba discloses that the hidden agenda of the downstream countries’ elites explains why they offer only mild or limited censure on China’s dams: it provides them more scope for their own hydropower dams’ development as well as ensuring access to inexpensive and reliable Chinese hydroelectricity.

 This variability in neighbours’ responses to China’s activities is exemplified by an example from the spring 2010 Mekong crisis, during which historically low water levels were documented from January to April 2010. Biba examines the temporal case by analysing media coverage from both the downstream countries and the United States, including responses from various civil society organizations and NGOs. Biba’s detailed analysis and discussion helps unveil how seriously the river basin civil society organizations, particularly those at a geographical distance, blamed China as the main cause of the water crisis. However, the messaging twist is with responses from each downstream country and the MRC, which explicitly argued that there was no clear evidence that China’s upstream dams primarily triggered the historically low level of water. This messaging indicates the Lower Mekong countries’ reluctance to securitize China’s dam-building activities at a state level.

 In a response to these varied views and approaches, Biba provides nuanced evaluations on China’s responses to the critiques as they emerged over four phases. First, China recognized the severe drought in the upstream of the Mekong River; second, China rejected the blame on its upstream dams; and third, China allowed for collaborative damage control through its willingness to share hydrological data with the Lower Mekong countries. In the fourth phase, China manoeuvred to prevent any accusations of responsibility for future drought by strengthening inter-state relationships via programmes to support expert exchanges and international training projects to increase expertise and capacity of the downstream countries. Biba argues that these activities represent China’s attempt to avert or reshape criticism by strengthening relationships and defining river basin management parameters.

 In a more recent example, Biba briefly evaluates the project-oriented Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC), initiated by China in 2015. Although the majority of LMC projects have been related to non-water sectors, Biba fully expects a significant investment in hydropower development in the downstream countries. In this regard, the LMC may be a gamechanger for transboundary water cooperation by redefining water resources management from China’s preferred perspective, in particular its focus on state-directed, project-focused development that can potentially dilute the MRC’s historic influence. This reviewer would have liked to see a more extended discussion of the LMC and how it may change the political economy of transboundary water relationships between China and the Mekong countries.

 Whilst there is abundant literature on the possible negative impacts of China’s upstream dams and its interactions with the Lower Mekong countries, Biba’s book provides comprehensive data, information and insights on China’s multilayered behaviours and activities related to an array of diverse watershed events. His assessment of the dual and concurrent existence of both cooperation and conflict within China’s behaviour is persuasive and imperative. His perspective is particularly compelling given the growing influence of the LMC amidst the increasingly crowded scene of competing international cooperation mechanisms in the river basin that now includes the United States, Japan, South Korea and India.

 An additional merit of this book is its provision of a macro-level explanation of the multifaceted behaviours of all Mekong riparian countries, not just China. The thorough evaluations of interactions between China and its riparian neighbours imply China’s gradual adoption of multilateral cooperation mechanisms and proactive engagement with its riparian neighbours in tune with its good neighbour policy. This reader would have appreciated additional discussions of the policy implications of the LMC for China and each riparian country. It would also be interesting to explore relationships between the LMC and the MRC, and in particular the positioning of the MRC as the LMC becomes more dominant in both water and non-water issues, and other cooperation mechanisms seek to counter this rise. Nevertheless, the securitization approach developed in this book provides a useful way of examining these issues generally, and more specifically, on China’s foreign policy towards the Mekong and its many other shared rivers.